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delay and the kind and amount of compensation it tenders, make it
of little use.
If the railroad jiroblem is in a transition state, the fact has an
important bearing upon a question much agitated, and to which
some paragraphs of the last presidential message are devoted-the
question of a national control of inter-state traffic. Apparently,
the point has not yet been reached where a satisfactory measure of
the kind can be adopted. The utmost it would seem, which can
safely be done, is the appointment of a carefully-selected commission, with powers quite limited save in the direction of investigation
and report.

CHARLES CHAUNCEY
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HUGHES v. PERCIVAL.
In the alteration or rebuilding of a house, involving the use of a party-wall, the
law casts upon the owner the duty of seeing that reasonable care and skill is exercised to prevent injury to the adjoining property, and he cannot avoid responsibility
by delegating the work to a third person.
A. employed a builder to tear down and rebuild his house. This involved the
use of a party-wall between the properties of A. and B. and the rebuilding of a
party-wall between the properties of A. and C. After the latter wall had been
rebuilt, and the house nearly finished, the workmen of the builder, in fixing a
staircase, without A.'s knowledge cut into the party-wall adjoining C.'s property,
and so weakened it that A.'s house fell, dragging over the other party-wall and
injuring B.Is property. This cutting was not authorized by the contract with the
builder.
Held, that A. was liable to B. for the damage to the latter's house.

THIS was an action for negligence in taking down two houses
standing on the defendant's land and erecting a new. house, whereby
the adjoining house of the plaintiff was injured.
The cause came on for trial at Westminster oh the 3d and 4th
of December 1880, before MANISTY, J., and a special jury, when
the following facts were in substance detailed by the plaintiff's
counsel in his opening address.
The defendant was the owner of a piece of land at the corner
of Panton street and the Haymarket, upon which stood two old
houses, Nos. 1 and 2 Panton street. The plaintiff was the owner
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of No. 3 Panton street, which immediately adjoined the defendant's houses on the east side thereof. Between the defendant's
houses and the plaintiff's house was a party-wall. On the south
side of the defendant's house and immediately adjoining it there
stood in the Haymarket a house occupied by one Baron. Between
the defendant's houses and Baron's house also was a party-wall,
which was stated to be rotten. The defendant being desirous of
pulling down his two old houses and rebuilding a new house in their
stead, employed a competent architect to prepare plans and to superintend the operations, and employed Newman & Mann as builders
to execute the work. The old houses were pulled down, and the
new house was built upon the defendant's land and nearly finished
without injury to the adjoining houses. " The party-wall between the
defendant's and Baron's houses was taken down as far as the first
floor, but it was left standing to the depth of twenity-two feet, and
then twenty-five feet of new work was built on topof what remained
of it. The wall was underpinned to a considerable extent. From
the old part of the wall an iron girder was placed to support the
first floor of the defendant's new house. Some of the girders of
the defendant's new house were fixed against the party-wall next
the plaintiff's house. When the defendant's house had been nearly
finished, it became necessary to fix a staircase, and in order-to fix
it the workmen of the builders cut into the party-wall between the
defendanit's house and Baron's house to the depth of a few inches
and to the height of about twenty feet. and to the width of about
seven feet. The defendant's architect raised some objections to
the proceedings of the builder's workmen in cutting away the wall.
Very soon -afterwards 'the defendant's house fell; by the fall the
party-wall between the plaintiff's house and the defendant's house
was dragged over, and the walls -of the plaintiff's house were
cracked and the house itself damaged.
This statement of facts not being disputed by the defendant's
counsel, without any witnesses having been examined, the learned
judge stated that there was a prima facie case of liability against
the defendant which required an answer.
The defendant's counsel then proceeded to address the jury.
He admitted that the new house of the defendant was to be a story
higher than the old house; but he stated that the defendant employed Mr. Wimple, the architect, to prepare plans which were
accepted by him; that he entered into a contract with Newman
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& Mann, the builders, for the execution of those plans ; that by
the terms of that contract, except to comply with the provisions
of some statute, no deviation from those plans was to be committed
without the authority of the defendant. The plans showed that
the party-wall between the defendant's two houses and Baron's
house was to be rebuilt. The defendant himself did not personally interfere with the work during its progress, and never authorized any deviation from the plans. But in the course of the work
it was agreed between Mr. Wimple and Mr. Wimperis, an architect
acting for the owner of Baron's house, that the party-wall between
the defendant's old houses and Baron's house should be taken
down only as far as the first floor, and that the wall should be
under-pinned in order to strengthen it, the basement or cellar of
the defendant's new house being excavated to a greater depth than
the basement of the defendant's old houses. The party-wall was
accordingly taken down only as far as the first floor, instead of
being wholly r'emoved as provided for in the plans, and it was under-pinned in order to give it additional strength. This was -done
without any signs of weakness, fracture or settlement appearing
in the party-wall. From the first floor the party-wall was newly
erected. The work proceeded, girders were placed in the ordinary
manner, and the house was roofed in. It became necessary to fix
a wooden staircase from the basement, which was not in itself a
hazardous operation; but the workmen of the builders, without
any knowledge of the foreman of the works or of the defendant's
architect, cut into the old part of the party-wall next Baron's
house ; this act was not permitted by the plans or specification, and
was wholly unauthorized. Mr. Wimple, the defendant's architect,
visited the works, and seeing the mischief which had been done,
ordered it to be made good. Signs of weakness began to appear,
and upon the very same night the defendant's house fell, injuring
thereby the plaintiff's house in the manner above described.
At the close of the opening address of the defendant's counsel,
the learned judge intimated that even if the defendant proved by
evidence all that had been alleged upon his behalf, he would have
no defence to the action, and he directed the jury to find for the
plaintiff, the damages to be agreed upon between the parties, or to
be ascertained by an arbitrator.
The court afterwards discharged a rule taken by defendant to
enter judgment in his favor, and the Court of Appeal disnissed an
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appeal taken from this order.
House of Lords.

Defendant then appealed to the

Philbrlck, Q. C., and Douglas8 Xingsford, for appellant.
Webster, Q. C., and Mc Call, for respondent.
LORD BLACKBURN.-My lords, this is an appeal against an
order of the Court of Appeal, dismissing an appeal from an order
of the Queen's Bench Division, discharging a rule obtained by the
defendant to enter judgment on the ground that the judge ought
to have directed a verdict for the defendant, or that there should
be a new trial.
The first point to be considered is, what was the relation in
which the defendant stood to the plaintiff. It was admitted that
they were owners of adjoining houses, between which 'was a partywall the property of both. The defendant pulled down his house
and had it rebuilt on a plan which involved in it the tying together
of this new building and the party-wall which was between the
plaintiff's house and the defendant's, so that if one fell the other
would be damaged. The defendant had a right so to utilize the
party-wall, for it was his property as well as the plaintiff's; a
stranger would not have had such a right. But I think the law
cast upon the defendant, when exercising this right, a duty towards
the plaintiff. I do not think that duty went so far as to require
him absolutely to provide that no damage should come to the plaintiff's wall from -the use he thus made of it, but I think that the
duty went as far as to require him to see that reasonable skill .and
care were exercised In those operations which involved a use of
the party-wall, exposing it to this risk. If such a duty was cast
upon the defendant he could not get rid of responsibility by delegating the performance of it to a third person. He was at liberty
to employ such a third person to fulfil the duty which the law cast
on himself, and, if they so agreed together, to take an indemnity
to himself in case mischief came from that person not fulfilling the
duty which the law cast upon the defendant; but the defendant
still remained subject to that duty, and liable for the consequences
if it was not fulfilled.
This is the law I think clearly laid down in _Pickardv. Smith,
10 C. B. (N. S.) 470, and finally in Dalton v. AvguR, 6 App.
Cas. 740. But in all the cases on the subject there was a duty
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cast by law on the party who was held liable. In Dalton v. Angus ,
supra, and in ]?ower v. Peate, 1 Q. B. D. 321, the defendants
had caused an interference with the plaintiff's right of support.
Chief Justice COCKBURN, it is true, in Bower v. .Peate, 1 Q. B. D.
821, 326, after showing this says: "The answer to the defendant's
contention may, however, as it appears to us, be placed on a broader
ground, namely, that a man who orders a work to be executed
from which in the natural course of things injurious consequences
to his neighbor must be expected to arise unless means are aaopted
by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to
the doing of that which is necessary to prevent the mischief, and
cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing some one
else-whether it be the contractor employed to do the work from
which the danger arises or some independent person-to do what
is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered to be done from
becoming wrongful."
I doubt whether this is not too broadly stated. If taken in the
full sense of the words it would seem to render a person who
orders post-horses and a coachman from an inn, bound to see that
the coachman, though not his servant but that of the innkeeper,
uses that skill and care which is necessary when driving the
coach to preven t mischief to the passengers. But the Court of
Queen's Bench had no intention, and indeed not being a court of
error had no power to alter the law laid down in Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499.
But if I am right in thinking that the defendant, in consequence of his using the party-wall of which the plaintiff was part
owner, had a duty cast upon him by law, similar to that which, in
Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740, it was held was cast upon the
defendant in that case, in consequence of his using the foundations
on which the plaintiff had a right of support, it is not necessary
now to inquire how far'this general language should be qualified.
I do not think the case of Butler v. Hunter, 7 H. & N. 826,
is consistent with my view of the law. I do -not know whether
the Court of Exchequer meant to deny that such a duty was cst
upon the defendant in that case, or meant to say that he might
escape liability by employing a contractor. If either was meant
by the Court of Exchequer I am obliged to differ from them.
If this be so the question is, I think, narrowed to this: Was the
operation, during which the defendant's duty required hita to see
VOL. XXXI1-13
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that reasonable care and skill should be used, over at the time when
those engaged in the work cut into the party-wall between the
defendant's house and Baron's? for it is not disputed that there
was a want of skill in doing this, and that it caused the damage;
and it is not disputed that the men who did it were intending to
carry out the work on which they were employed.
The defence' opened at th6 trial, I think, was directed to this,
that the contractor was bound not to do anything without written
authority, and that there was no authority at all to cut into the
party-wall. I do not think that could prevent the act which was
done from being in breach of the defendant's duty.
The late Lord Justice HOLKE, however, thought, as I understand
him, that the whole of the operation coA*ected with the use of the
plaintiffs party-wall was over, and that the contractor's men were
engaged in a subsequent independent job, and that the defendant
was under no further duty thei than he would have been itafter
the house was finished, he -had brought in carpenters to repair a
wooden staircase. I cannot, however, take this view of the counsel's
opening. I regret, that the case was stopped on the counsel's
opening, for I feel convinced that if the evidence had been gone
into this view of the fact could -not have been taken. As.it is, I
do not think it necessary to say more of the view of the law taken
by the late Lord Justice than that I think it well worthy of consideration in any case where the facts are as he seems to suppose.
I think that the order appealed against should be affirmed, and
the appeal dismissed with costs.
Concurring opinions'were delivered by Lords WATSoN and FITZGERALD.

Appeal dismissed with costs.
The principal case is the most recent
utterance of the House of Lords upon
the exceedingly important subject of a
person's liability for injuries resulting
from work done for his benefit, though
not by his servant. The case seems to
have been most carefully considered,
and Lords BLAc3xmnm, WATSON and
EITZGERA D, while concurring in the
judgment rendered, arrive at their conclusiou by slightly different reasoningLord BLAcitnumi's argument seems to

be, where an exercise of a right involves danger to the property of a
neighbor, the party exercising such
right is bound to provide against the
danger by all reasonable prudence and
care, and cannot rid himself of the
responsibility by the employment of a
third person. In this view Lord MkTZoGRALD substantially agrees, but goes a
little further, and would seem to say
that an employer would not be permitted to show that the work which
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finally caused the catastrophe could not
reasonably have been presumed hazardous, without showing in addition that it
was an independent job which he did
not authorize. Lord WATSON, on the
contrary, expressed himself inclined to
agree with Lord Justice HoLERn, who,
in the court below, had held that if the
work was not hazardous in the eyes of
reasonable men, and, while in the same
general undertaking, was not the original job, the hazardous part of which
had been completed, there was no liability on the part of the employer for the
negligence of the contractor's servants.
It will be at once remarked, as, indeed,
Lord FITZGERAXL concedes, that the
doctrine of the principal case comes very
near making employers in such cases
insurers of the safety of their neighbor's
property. His lordship says : ,1The
law has been verging somewhat in the direction of treating parties engaged in
.such an operation as the defendants as
insurers of their neighbors, or warranting them against injury. It has
not, however, quite reached that point.
It does declare that under such a state
of circumstances it was the duty of the
defendant to have used every reasonable
precaution that care and skill might suggest in the execution of his work, so as
to protect his neighbor from injury, and
that he cannot get rid of the responsibility thus cast upon him by transferring that duty to another. He is not
in the actual position of being responsible for injuries no matter how occasioned, but he must be vigilant and
careful, for he is liable for injuries to
his neighbor caused by any want of
prudence or precaution even though it
may be culpa leissia."
The English cases are inharmonious.
The earliest decision of note was that
in Bush v. Steinman, I Bos. & Pul. 404.
In the process of construction of a
house by contract, the servant of a subcontractor left some lime in the road in
front of the premises, whereby plain

tiff's carriage was overturned. The
owner of the house was held liable.
Chief Justice EYRE, in delivering his
opinion, expresses himself as in great
doubt as to the satisfactoriness of the
principle of the decision. He seems to
prefer to rest the judgment upon the
ground that the lime was a nuisance
which no man has a right to allow to
be maintained for his benefit. HEAkT,
J., bases his opinion squarely upon the
ground that the work was being performed for the defendant's benefit, and
that he must bear all loss occasioned
during its progress. In Laugher v.
Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, A. had hired a
driver and horses from a livery-stable,
and by the negligent driving of his carriage plaintiff was injured. It was
admitted that the relation of master and
servant did not exist between A. and
the driver, but on the authority of Bush
v. Steinman, supra, it was sought to
hold him liable. The court divided
equally upon the point, Justice LITTLEDALE distinguishing Bush v. Steanman, supra, on the ground that a different rule applied to cases where a man
had work done on his premises from
which injury resulted, from that which
should govern a case like the one before
him. A precisely similar case was
Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499,
in which Justice LITTLEDALE'S view in
Laugher v. Pointer, supra, is adopted
by Baron PiARK.
This case is considered by Lord BLACKBURx in the
principal case, as settling the law, that
in cases where there is nothing hazardous in the nature of work the contractor
only is liable for negligent acts of his
servants.
The cases gradually departed from
the rule of Bush v. &einman, I Boa. &
Pal. 404, and the distinction between
acts done with real and those with
personal property, has been both in
England and in this country pronounced
untenable. The cases on the subject in
the Exchequer have all held a less severe
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doctrine of liability on the part of the
employer; and proceed upon the principle that unless the acts contracted to
be done are themselves unlawful, either
as creating a nuisance, or as of themselves producing injury, there is no such
liability: Butler v. Hunter, 7 H. & N.
826; Reedie v. Railway, 4 Exch. 244.
To the same effect is Ellis v. She.ffleld
Gas Co., 2 Ellis & Black. 767, a case
in which Lord CAMPriELL delivered
the opinion. Bush v. Steinman has
been considered overruled by these
cases. But the reasoning of the Exchequer has not been satisfactory to the
House of Lords, or to the King's Bench,
and the later cases, as was observed by
Lord FITZGERALD, have tended toward
a more stringent rule. Pickard r.
Smith, 10 C. I3. (N. S.) 470, was a
case where the injury resulted frori the
negligence of a coal-dealer's servant in
leaving unguarded an opening through
which he was shooting coals into defendant's cellar. The defendant was
held liable, Wiz.nIwAs, J., saying:
"If a contractor is employed to do a
lawful act, and in the course of his
work he or his servants commit some.
casual act of wrong or negligence, the
employer is not answerable. * * * That
rule is, however, inapplicable to cases
in which the act which occasions the
injury is one which the contractor was
employed to do; nor by parity of
reasoning to cases in which the contractor is intrusted with performance
of a duty incumbent upon his employer,
and neglects its fulfilment, whereby an
injury is occasioned." This last doctrine was alluded to in a much later
case, Bower v. Peate, I Q. B. Div.
321, in the course of argument, by
FIELD, J.
But Herschell, Q. C.,
replied, that the remarks on that point
by Justice WiLai s,
besides being
dicta, were only applicable to the maintenance of nuisances. The doctrine is
well illustrated by Tarry v. Ashton, 1
Q. B. Div. 314, where a lamp in front

of the defendant's house was in a dilapidated condition, and he employed a contractor to repair it and others, and
through his negligence in not doing so
it fell, injuring the plaintiff.
The
defendant was held liable. Bower v.
Peate, supra, was for injuries caused
by the negligent removal of lateral support. The defendants were held liable,
Lord CocunuRN saying: "There is
an obvious difference between committing work to a contractor to be
executed, from which, if properly done,
no injury can arise, and handing over
to him, work to be done from which
mischievous consequences will arise
unless preventive measures are taken."
This case, and Da!m v. Asqus, 6
App. Cas. 740, which followed it, are
approved in the principal case. It
will thus be seen that English law
has almost returned to Busk v. Steinman.
The great preponderance of authority
in America is in accord with the view
taken by the Court of Exchequer. The
subject has received a great deal of
attention, and the cases are interesting
and instructive. Bush v. Steinma, is
almost universally disapproved, and
the distinction between real and personal property is rejected as unfounded.
The leading cases are:
Blake v. Ferris, I Seld. 48; Carter
v. Berlin Mills Co., 58 N. H. 52;
Pawlet v. Railroad, 28 Vt. 298; Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray 349; Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469; De Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 371; Clark v.
Fr, 8 Ohio St. 358; Homer v.
Nicholson, 56 Mo. 220: Robiason v.
Webb, 11 Bush 464; S&camm a v. City
of Chicago, 25 11. 424. The law is
well stated in Clark v. Fry, sqra.
1. The rule of respondent superior, as
its name imports, only arises out of the
relation of superior and subordinate.
The reason of it is to be traced to the
power of control and direction which
the superior has the right to exercise,
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and which, for the safety of others, he
is bound to exercise.
2. This rule doegnot apply to a case
of injury sustained by reason of negligence in the manner of conducting the
execution of a job of work in building a
house, where the house builder, by a
contract with the owner of a lot, has
taken upon himself the responsibility of
the employment of his own hands and
the control and direction of the work in
conformity with the terms of the contract.
3. Where anything to be done under
the contract is itself unlawful, or
necessarily injurious to a third person,
the employer as well as the employee
would be liable for any injury resulting
therefrom; but where this is not the
case, and the employer .has not the control or direction in the execution of the
work, he is not responsible for any negligence or other wrongful act committed
in the performance of it.
4. Where, however, the owner of
real estate wilfully suffers a nuisance to
be created or continued on his premises
by another in the prosecution of a business for his benefit, when he has the
power to prevent or abate the nuisance,
he will be liable for an injury resulting
therefrom. See, in addition to eases
already cited, Conners v. Hennessey, 112
Mass. 96; King v. Livermore, 9 Hun
298 (aft. 71 N. Y. 605); Earl v.
Beadfeston, 10 J. & Sp. 294; King v.
Railroad, 66 N. Y. 181; Kellogg
v. Payne, 21 Iowa 577 ; Cunningham v.
Railroad, 51 Texas 503; Ryan v. Curran, 64 Ind. 345 ; Pfas v. Williamson,
63 Ill. 16 ; Smith v. Simmons, 13 W.,
N. C. (Pa.) 243; City of Erie v.
Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 247 ; Allen v.
Willard, 57 Id. 374.
Two or three earlier cases in Illinois
and Massachusetts, supported by dicta
in later cases, hold a corporation liable
for negligence of contractors to whom it
has intrusted the exercise of its rights
on the lands of others granted by the

legislature: Hinde v. Wabash Co., 15
Ill. 72; Lesher v. Wabash Co., 14 Id.
85, approved in Railroadv. Woosley, 85
Id. 370; Lowell v. Railroad Co., 23
Pick. 24; dicta in Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray 349 ; Cunningham v.
Railroad, 51 Texas 503. The rule is
said to be founded on public policy.
The law is otherwise in Maine: Eaton
v. Railroad, 59 Mfe. 520 ; Tibbetts v.
Railroad, 62 Id. 437.
Where an undertaking has been completed and accepted, although the negligence of the contractor in the execution
of it may cause the injury, the employer
is liable: Robbins y. Chicago, 4 Wall.
657 ; Railroad Co. v. Steamboat Co., 23
How. 209; Gorham v. Gross, 125
Mass. 232 ; Mulchey v. Society, 125
Id. 487. A misapprehension of Robbins v. Chicago, supra, led the court
astray in Palmer v. City of Lincoln, 5
Neb. 136.
The most recent decisions in England
and America, are, it will be seen, different in tendency. In England there
has been a reaction in favor of the
earlier decisions--in America there has
been no such reaction. But if it be
-conceded that the relation of contractor and contractee is not that of
superior and subordinate, it is conceived that it admits of but one logical answer, namely, that where it is
shown (as the cases properly require)
that the employer had reasonL to believe
the contractor competent, his liability
for injuries caused by the execution of a
lawful work in a negligent or unskilful manner, whether such negligence
take the form of acts or omissions, is
done, away with. The distinctions between real and personal property, or as
just mentioned, between acts and omissions, will be seen to be untenable when
it is borne in mind that the employe;
has absolutely nothing, actually or constructively, to do with the acts of people
engaged in a separate employment, who
are frot his subordinates. Whether the

